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Abstract
Under the conditions prevalent in the late Pleistocene (small hunter-
gatherer groups and frequent inter-group conflicts), coevolution of
gene-related behavior and culturally transmitted group-level institu-
tions provides a plausible explanation for the parochial altruistic and
reciprocator traits of most modern humans. When, with the agri-
cultural revolution, societies became larger and more complex, the
collective nature of the monitoring and punishment of norm violators
was no longer effective. This led to the emergence of new institutions
of governance and social hierarchies. Likely, the smooth acceptance of
the new institutions was possible only because, in the majority of the
population, the reciprocator trait had become an internalized norm.
However the new ruling class has its own dynamics which in turn may
lead to new social crisis. Using a simple model, inspired on previous
work by Bowles and Gintis, these effects are studied here.
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1 Introduction
It is a fact that humans are a highly cooperative species. Cooperative in
helping each other, cooperative in achieving material and intellectual achieve-
ments unmatched by other species, but also cooperative in war and genocide.
From the biological point of view, human cooperation is an evolutionary puz-
zle. Unlike other creatures, humans cooperate with genetically unrelated in-
dividuals, with people they will never meet again, when reputation gains are
small or absent and even engage in altruistic punishment of defectors. These
patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by kin selection, signalling the-
ory or reciprocal altruism. The idea that group selection might explain this
behavior goes back to Darwin himself who, in chapter 5 of the “Descent
of man and selection in relation to sex”, states that “... an increase in the
number of well-endowed men and an advancement in the standard of morality
will certainly give an immense advantage of one tribe over another.” How-
ever, this idea felt in disrepute because evolution does not pitch groups again
groups , nor individuals against individuals, but genes against genes. Then, a
“selfish gene” analysis makes the altruistic good-of-the-group outcome virtu-
ally impossible to achieve. In particular because the late Pleistocene groups
of modern man were not believed to be genetically sufficiently different to fa-
vor group selection. Therefore, human cooperation remained an evolutionary
puzzle.
In recent years Bowles, Gintis and collaborators [1] [2] [3] [4] revived the
group selection idea by showing that the particular environment and type
of the hunter-gatherer groups of the late Pleistocene (which corresponds to
about 95% of the evolutionary time of modern man) were such that a multi-
level evolutionary dynamics involving gene-culture coevolution could account
for the development of the cooperative altruistic trait which they call strong
reciprocity. The cost of group beneficial behavior to an individual would be
limited by the emergence of group-level social norms. On the other hand,
even in the absence of these group-level norms, group selection pressures
would support the evolution of the cooperative-altruistic punishment trait if
intergroup conflicts were very frequent. Egalitarian practices among ances-
tral humans reduced the force of individual selection against altruists, while
frequent warfare made altruistic cooperation among group members essential
to survival. That is, parochial altruism and warfare could have coevolved.
Furthermore they developed simple mathematical models that gave quanti-
tative support to their ideas.
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I think that the analysis of Bowles and Gintis provides a convincing pic-
ture of the genesis of the cooperative nature of humans and their culture. The
human capacity for social norm building and for the cultural transmission of
learned behavior allowed altruistic other-regarding preferences to proliferate.
But it also suggests that the other-regarding preferences that we inherited
from primeval man are partly cultural not purely genetic. Therefore liable
to change at a much faster pace than if they were purely genetic. A nat-
ural question is what is happening to this human trait (that presumably
developed during a period of 190000 years) in the short time (10000 years)
since the end of the Pleistocene. Using a simple version of the Bowles-Gintis
model I have analyzed in [5] the evolution of the reciprocator trait in a sit-
uation where the size of the society and the degree of clustering precludes
the collective nature of rule violator monitoring. Both an agent-based and a
mean-field model were used. The main conclusion was that in this situation
the reciprocator trait would not be evolutionary stable.
Historically one knows that such transition from the small hunter-gatherer
groups to larger sedentary population groups occurred at the time of the agri-
cultural revolution and that the solution was the emergence of government.
That is, a new type of agent (the ruler, the authority) came into play and
replaced the type of egalitarian decision-making that might have existed be-
fore. It is worth noticing that the apparent ease with which humans accepted
this transition of power may have much to do with the internalization of the
reciprocator trait, that above complete freedom valued the enforcing of social
norms.
In the agricultural societies, specialization arose as well as new security
needs and more intense population pressure on limited resources. This tended
to produce greater organization within the community, which in turn led to
social hierarchies, to certain forms of chieftainship and to a whole class of
people with managing roles. The government rulers that the first agricultural
societies accepted were in general priestly figures (the summerian Ensi) which
might have depicted themselves as servants of the gods, acting in behalf of
the community. Here the emergence of organized religion appears as a norm-
enforcing tool, because it is easier for the ruler to invoke the will of the gods
than their own personal preferences. As time went on, especially because
of the creation of other rival city states, the cities came to rely more and
more on military leaders and the ruling priests gave place to military leaders
(Lugal – the King).
In this paper, using a setting similar to the one in [5], I will study the
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effect of introducing in the model a new agent representing the role of the
authorities. The collective monitoring and punishment of the reciprocators
will be a decreasing function of the population size in the social group which
is allowed to grow with the average fitness. The need to introduce authority
agents to avoid a “tragedy of the commons”, that is, a fitness crisis arising
from the proliferation of the self-regarding agents, is an expected effect. This
is what was called above the emergence of government. The interesting
question is that the dynamics of the authority agents may, by itself, lead
to a new fitness crisis which will called a tragedy of authorities. This crisis
may or may not be related to the e´lite overproduction crisis that some authors
[6] [7] [8] have identified. This will be discussed in the final section of the
paper.
2 Emergence of government and the “tragedy
of authorities”
The basic setting is similar to the one used before [2] [5] as far as the type of
public goods activity is concerned in a group of N agents, N being in general
a function of time. Here however three types of agents are considered. The
first type (R-agents) are cooperators that also have a monitoring effect on the
cooperation of other agents. The second are self-regarding agents (S-agents)
and the third are purely monitoring agents (A-agents). The labels that were
chosen refer to the names reciprocators (R), self-regarding or shirkers (S) and
authorities (A). The percentages of each one of the types in the population
are denoted by fR, fS and fA.
Each R or S-agent can produce a maximum amount of goods q at cost
b (with goods and costs in fitness units). An S-agent benefits from shirking
public goods work by decreasing the cost of effort b (σ), σ being the fraction
of time the agent shirks. As before, the following conditions hold
b (0) = b, b (1) = 0, b
′
(σ) < 0, b
′′
(σ) > 0 (1)
Furthermore q (1− σ) > b (σ) so that, at every level of effort, working helps
the group more than it hurts the worker.
For b (σ) one chooses [1]
b (σ) =
2
2σ − 1 +
√
1 + 4/b
−
2
1 +
√
1 + 4/b
(2)
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which satisfies the constraints (1).
R-agents never shirk and punish each free-rider at cost cσ and probability
p (N), the cost being shared by all R-agents. For an S-agent the estimated
cost of being punished is sσ, punishment being ostracism or some other fitness
decreasing measure. Punishment and cost of punishment are proportional to
the shirking time σ. c is the reciprocator unit of punishment cost. s is the
weight given by an S-agent to the possibility of being punished. It may or
may not be the same as the actual fitness costs of punishment (γ, γA). Each
S-agent chooses σ (the shirking time fraction) to minimize the function
B (σ) = b (σ) + s (fR + fA) σ − q (1− σ)
1
N
(3)
From the point of view of an S-agent (fR + fA) σ is the probability of be-
ing monitored and punished. The last term is the agent’s share of his own
production. The value σS that minimizes B (σ) is
σS = max

min

1
2
−
√
1
4
+
1
b
+
1√
s (fR + fA) +
q
N
, 1

 , 0

 (4)
The contribution of each species to the population in the next time period
is proportional to its fitness piR, piS or piA computed from
pi
′
R = q (1− fA − fSσS) x− b− cp (N) fS
NσS
NfR
pi
′
S = q (1− fA − fSσS) x− b (σS)− (γp (N) fR + γAfA) σS
pi
′
A = q (1− fA − fSσS)wx− cAfS
NσS
NfA
(5)
and piR,S,A = max
(
pi
′
R,S,A, 0
)
because the baseline fitness is zero.
The first term in both pi
′
R, pi
′
S and pi
′
A is the benefit arising from the
produced public goods. The factors x and wx with
x =
1
wfA + 1− fA
account for the fact that this benefit is the same for R and S-agents but
might be different for A-agents. The second term in pi
′
R and pi
′
S is the work
effort. The third term in pi
′
R and the second term in pi
′
A represent the fitness
cost of punishment for R and A-agents and the third term in pi
′
S the cost
incurred by S-agents when they are punished.
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The γ and γA coefficients code for the severity of the coercive measures
affecting the fitness of S-agents. The last term in pi
′
R and pi
′
A emphasizes
the heavy punishing burden put on R or A-agents when in small number.
The factor p (N), a decreasing function of N , accounts for the fact that
(as studied at length in [5]), when a social group grows in size, the collective
nature of monitoring of free-riders becomes increasingly difficult. Essentially,
the punishment probability by R-agents should be a growing function of the
clustering coefficient of the group. Here, for illustration purposes, one chooses
a simple function of N
p (N) =
√√√√ 1 + δ
1 + δ N
N0
N0 being some small initial population.
Finally, for the evolution of the population at successive generations, one
chooses a replicator map1
fα,new = fα
Πα (f)
fRΠS + fsΠS + fAΠA
(6)
α = R, S,A.
First one studies the dynamics of R and S-agents alone, keeping fA = 0.
In this case, using (4) and (5), the evolution of fR = 1− fs corresponds to a
one-dimensional map which is illustrated in Fig.1 for two values of p (N) (1, 0
and 0.5). For p (N) = 1 the map has an unstable fixed point at A (fR (A) ≃
0.57), a left-stable fixed point at B (fR (B) ≃ 0.85) and a continuum of
neutral fixed points after that. For p (N) = 0.5 only the neutral fixed points
remain. The neutral fixed points correspond to the situation where S-agents
do not shirk for fear of being punished. For initial conditions smaller than
fR (A) in the first case or fR (B) in the second the population of R-agents is
always invaded by S-agents. However the neutrality of the fixed points means
that the population of S-agents is not completely invaded by the R-agents.
Next, still keeping fA = 0, the evolution of the population of R and S-
agents is studied when the population increases in time according to a global
fitness dependent law, chosen as
N (t+ 1) = N (t) eβpi
1A different, incremental, dynamics is sometimes used for the fitness-based evolution
of populations. The replicator map used here provides faster evolution but qualitatively
similar results, up to a renormalization of the time scale.
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Figure 1: One-dimensional map for the evolution of R-agents corresponding
to fA = 0, q = 2, b = 1, c = 0.1, γ = 4, s = 3, N = 20
with pi =
∑
α fαpiα.
In Fig.2 are displayed the results for a time-evolution starting from N0 =
20, fR = 0.7, fS = 0.3. In the upper left plot the percentages fR, fS and fA
(fA = 0 in this case) of each agent type are displayed as the distances to the
three sides of a triangle. One sees that as long as the population (N) remains
small the monitoring effects of R-agents controls shirking (σ) by the S-agents
and, as a result, their percentage (fR) and fitness (ΠR) increases as well as the
average fitness of the group. However, with further population growth the
punishment probability (p (N)) of shirkers decreases leading for a while to a
higher degree of shirking (σ) and higher fitness (ΠS) and percentage (fS) of
S-agents. But because S-agents with high σ produce much less goods, finally
the fitness of all agents decreases and the group collapses. This is the well-
known tragedy of the commons, here induced by the fact that monitoring of
the public goods behavior of the agents cannot be a fully collective activity
in a large society.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of R- and S-agents with fA = 0, q = 2, b = 1, c =
0.1, γ = 4, s = 3, N0 = 20
It is then natural that a population group whose success is based on co-
operation and control of selfish behavior, would recognize the need, beyond a
certain population level, to assign the control and punishing role to special-
ized agents, with extra power and authority. This is what one might call the
emergence of government. In the model, one now starts from the same initial
conditions, but when fR reaches a value below 0.5 unfreeze the dynamics of
A-agents, imposing however, for the moment, the constraint that fA should
not exceed 0.2 and, to isolate the effect of the A-agents, the population is
assumed to be constant after that moment. The result is shown in Fig.3.
The outcome is rather satisfactory. After the unfreezing of the fA dynam-
ics the percentage of R-agents still decreases for a while, but then it stars to
grow and the group stabilizes at an high level of average fitness.
Notice that the growth of the number of A-agents is rather fast. The
reason is that as soon as they start controlling the behavior of the S-agents,
both σ and fS decrease, therefore greatly increasing the fitness of the A-
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Figure 3: Time evolution with the three types of agents but fA ≤ 0.2. (q =
2, b = 1, c = 0.1, s = 3, cA = 0.45, γ = 4, γA = 11)
agents, because they benefit from the goods produced without incurring the
cost of control because there is almost nothing to control anymore. If one now
removes the 0.2 bound on fA (Fig.4) the A-agents population continues to
grow but, because they produce no goods, the average fitness finally decreases
to zero as the group collapses. This is a crisis of a different type that one
might call the tragedy of authorities. What this means for actual societies
will be discussed later.
A very similar effect is obtained if, while keeping fA bounded, one allows
w to grow with the fitness of A-agents. That is, allowing the share of goods
allotted to A-agents to grow.
Here I would only like to emphasize the delicate nature of the balance
between the several agents in a viable society and the emergence of what seem
to be universal features in the human social evolution. Cooperation is at
the root of success in human groups. However a natural, perhaps biological,
tendency of humans to minimize effort and to maximize benefits requires that
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Figure 4: Time evolution with the three types of agents and fA allowed to
grow above 0.2 after time 500. (q = 2, b = 1, c = 0.1, s = 3, cA = 0.45, γ =
4, γA = 11
a certain amount of control of shirking is required. This led some humans
to internalize the idea that shirkers should be controlled. Apparently, it
is the societies where more humans adopted this norm that were the most
successful. When, after the agricultural revolution the human groups became
larger, collective control became more difficult. Then, the evolved acceptance
of social norms led naturally to the acceptance of government as a specialized
body. However the dynamics of the authority agents may, by itself, lead to
a new fitness crisis.
3 Remarks and conclusions
Stylized mathematical models, both in natural and human sciences, are not
intended to take care of all the details that each particular system possesses.
Rather, they are intended to extract general features or universal mecha-
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nisms, if any, that rule the dynamics of the system. Then, of course, the
detailed characteristics that each physical system or society has, will deter-
mine the time scales and intensity of the universal features.
The general features that may be extracted from this and previous works
are:
1) Under the conditions prevalent in the late Pleistocene, that is, small
population groups, frequent inter-group conflicts and a species with the ca-
pacity for norm enforcing and cultural transmission of learned behavior, the
reciprocator trait may become dominant although, in general, not completely
invasive of the self-regarding type.
2) In a large population, monitoring of public goods behavior cannot be a
fully collective activity, rather being the chore of those in close contact with
the free-riders. Because punishment of free-riders requires a local consen-
sus among reciprocators, the clustering nature of the society would play an
important role in the maintenance and evolution of the reciprocator trait. Al-
though large human societies tend to be “small worlds” in the sense of short
path lengths they do not necessarily maintain a high degree of clustering.
Therefore norm monitoring and enforcing requires new special institutions
of governance. However, the new institutions bring with them social hierar-
chies, which imply inequalities. Therefore, acceptance of the new institutions
is only possible if in the majority of the population the reciprocator trait had
become an internalized norm.
3) The evolutionary dynamics of the agents associated to governance, that
is the ruling class, may by its proliferation or by assigning to itself a higher
share of the production (an high w factor in the model of Section 2) provoke a
decrease of the average fitness, a crisis or even a collapse of the society. This
is what has been called here the tragedy of authorities. Some authors [6] [7]
[8] have studied the historical effects of “e´lite overproduction” as generating
crisis and revolutions. However not all cases of e´lite overproduction that
they characterize can be identified with the phenomena of the tragedy of
authorities. If e´lite overproduction is, for example, the proliferation of an
aristocratic class, that under the protection of the ruler lives from the society
production without contributing to it, then it has all the marks of a tragedy
of authorities. But if, instead, e´lite overproduction is associated to an higher
access of the youth to higher education, this is not a tragedy of authorities.
The eventual crisis that may occur in this case results from the fact that the
new educated agents are not incorporated neither in the productive sector
nor as beneficiaries of the society production. Hence it is not a tragedy of
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authorities. In fact they are only reacting against an authority structure that
wants to preserve their privileges. Therefore to associate this two distinct
situations under the same e´lite overproduction label may be quite misleading.
As has been shown in Section 2, the existence of authority agents is
beneficial to society as long as their number and their share of the goods
remains limited. The problem therefore is the old question of who controls
the controllers. Democracy is in principle a way to implement limitations
and accountability of the rulers. But even then, nothing is guaranteed. Eco-
nomic power easily escapes constraints of democratic control. And even more
subtle effects may occur. For example, through exploration of the co-evolved
parochial feelings of the population, it is easy to erect as a goal the prolif-
eration of local or regional government structures, coordinating committees,
etc. Layers and layers of control when there is nothing else to control.
4) Even subtler effects of emergent tragedies of authorities are found ev-
erywhere. The solidary form of collective government of the hunter-gatherer
groups was probably the most successful invention of modern man, leading to
his dominance over other species and even over other hominids. It was also
the most extensively tested of all, lasting for 95% of the evolutionary history
of modern man. Centralized, professional forms of government, by compar-
ison, are a very recent development, not always very successful. Hence, it
could be rationally expected that, whenever applicable, ”community govern-
ment” would be used. In fact and except in very rare cases this is not so.
Instead, centralized forms of government tend to migrate to all local levels
carrying with them the kind of political party-oriented issues, which are not
necessarily the most relevant at the local community level.
5) Evolutionary stability of the reciprocator trait is very much dependent
on social norms and transmission of culture. Therefore it is a trait that
depends as much on genetics as on culture. Some direct evidence of this comes
from the fact that experimental games played by adults and young children
have different results. Culturally-inherited traits may have a much faster
dynamics than gene-based ones. Therefore if the reciprocator trait has a high
cultural component, it is critical to understand how modern society might
be acting on or modifying it. A considerable loss of cooperative behavior
might change society in many unexpected ways. Could less altruism come
along with less hostility to strangers? If contemporary man is becoming more
Homo Economicus maybe it would not be necessary to rewrite the classical
economy books.
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